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The proposed study investigated an attentional bias in experimentally-induced 
dysphoria using self-relevant pictures in a dot probe study design.  Participants generated 
their own photographs, using digital cameras to capture stimuli that are self-relevant and 
emotional to them.  It was hypothesized that individuals with induced dysphoria would 
exhibit a greater attentional bias to negative stimuli than participants with induced 
happiness when self-generated pictures were used in a dot-probe paradigm.  In addition, 
exploratory analyses were conducted to examine possible gender effects.  To examine the 
first hypothesis, a MANOVA was conducted including the priming groups and gender as 
the predictors and the bias scores as the dependent variables.  Results did not support the 
primary hypothesis.  Regarding gender effects, females responded longer on all trials, and 
the interaction of gender and priming condition neared significance for negative 
attentional bias scores.  It was also hypothesized that the importance and valence ratings 
of the pictures would significantly predict response latency, but this prediction was not 
supported by the data. The findings of this study are discussed in terms of cognitive 
theories of attentional biases in depression as well as methodological issues in this line of 
work. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1967) has laid the foundation for 
other theories and research on “cognitive” aspects of depression such as rumination, 
mood congruency, selective attention and negativity biases.  According to Beck’s 
original theory (1967), depressed and non-depressed individuals process information 
differently.   Consistent with previous work on schemas as a broad construct, Beck 
proposed that all individuals encode and organize information from the environment into 
schemas (Rush & Beck, 1979).  Schemata are defined as “organized networks of past 
reactions and experiences that form a relatively cohesive body of knowledge capable of 
guiding subsequent perception and behaviors,” (Segal 1988, p.147).  External 
circumstances prompt the activation of a given schema, which influences the individual’s 
interpretation of the event and his/her emotional responses as well (Rush & Beck, 1979). 
Any individual has access to a plethora of schemata in reference to an event, but 
subconsciously activates certain schemata in response to the situation. 
Although non-depressed individuals also use schematic processing (Dykman et 
al., 1989; Haack et al., 1996, Haaga & Beck, 1995; Hollon & Garber, 1988), it is 
proposed that negativity biases arise in depressed individuals because even though they 
have access to all types of information, negative information (reactions and experiences) 
is activated more readily and is also used to “fill in the informational gaps” in ambiguous 
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situations (Halberstadt et al., 2008, p. 844).  Thus, depressed individuals may experience 
problematic “matching of stimulus and appropriate schema due to the intrusion of 
inappropriate schemas displacing the more appropriate ones” (Rush & Beck, 1979, 
p.204).  Therefore, it is hypothesized that the difference between depressive and non- 
depressive cognition may be a function of attention to negative content, as depressed 
individuals orient to and recall negative information more readily than those that are 
non- depressed (Halberstadt et al., 2008).  In addition, Beck suggests that these 
maladaptive schemas may be more readily activated under conditions of stressful or 
negative life events (Beck, 1987).  Therefore, according to Beck’s diathesis-stress model, 
negative depressive cognitions will be exacerbated in the face of stress. 
Negativity Biases in Explicit Memory Tasks and Self Report Measures: Content 
 
Negativity 
 
Beck captured the concept of content negativity with the introduction of the 
cognitive triad.  The cognitive triad consists of three negative views depressed 
individuals tend to express: negative views of the self, the future, and the world (Beck, 
1976).  Research has confirmed a negativity bias in the content of depressive self views 
and thoughts in explicit memory tasks.  These tasks include measures that overtly prompt 
participants to retrieve knowledge about themselves, the world, and also past events and 
experiences (Baddeley, Eysenck & Anderson, 2009).  Depressed individuals tend to 
report more negative self views than non-depressed on questionnaires such as the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) and the Crandell 
Cognitions Inventory (Crandell & Chambless, 1986).  These measures require the 
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respondent to recall the frequency with which he or she experiences certain thoughts or 
ideas. Depressed individuals also tend to endorse lower self esteem and are more likely 
to engage in self blame in the face of negative life events (Wisco, 2009).  Recent research 
has also identified the concept of self rumination, where one has the tendency to dwell on 
one’s own experiences of depression.  Ruminative thought is proposed to place the 
individual at an increased risk of developing or maintaining depressive symptomatology 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Wisco, Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 2008). 
Negativity Biases and Elaborative Processing 
 
Although there has been a plethora of research documenting negative depressive 
cognition in explicit memory tasks and self report questionnaires such as those mentioned 
previously, recently there has been a shift to examine underlying processes whereby these 
cognitions arise (Williams, Watts, Macleod & Matthews, 1997).  Researchers have found 
a negativity bias in implicit memory tasks as well (e.g. word-stem completion, priming). 
Implicit memory tasks do not overtly prompt participants to recall past events or 
experiences, but indirectly examine the behavioral responses of the participants 
(Baddeley, Eysenck & Anderson, 2009).  Although the bias exhibited in these implicit 
tasks has been specific to tasks that required deeper processing (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; 
Watkins, 2002).  Depth of processing refers to the extent the stimuli (semantic or 
pictorial) are processed and incorporated into memory (Wisco, 2009).  Deeper processing 
has been suggested to occur later than automatic or early processing, may include 
elaboration in memory, and requires greater attentional resources compared to shallow or 
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automatic processing (Wisco, 2009).  Levels of processing models have been criticized 
 
for their inability to explain whether differences in performance (e.g., recall rates) are due 
to retrieval and/or encoding effects (Baddeley, Eysenck & Anderson, 2009).  In addition, 
depth of processing is often correlated with the passage of time and associated with 
enhanced encoding, such that deeper processing is thought to be associated with longer 
lengths of time spent encoding the material.  However, this tends to be a circular 
argument that lacks clarification as to the underlying mechanisms accounting for the 
observed results.  In addition, length of time is not a reliable predictor of depth of 
processing, as research has documented poorer performance with increased study times 
(Baddeley, Eysenck & Anderson, 2009).   Thus, the encoding and retrieval procedures 
(e.g. elaboration, context dependent cues) implemented may have greater utility in 
explicating the underlying mechanisms in negativity biases using both explicit and 
implicit memory task paradigms. 
However, the current state of research examining negativity biases fails to take 
these factors into account (Wisco, 2009).  For example, current research examining 
negative attentional biases only offer snapshots of attentional engagement using response 
latency paradigms.  Mogg and Bradley’s (2005) review of the attentional bias research 
indicated that attention biases in depression have been documented only at longer 
presentation times (>1200 ms) and in tasks examining attentional displacement (focus of 
attention at the offset of target presentation) rather than the initial focusing of attention. 
This implies that negativity biases may arise in later stages of information processing and 
may require greater lengths of time for the effects of encoding effects (e.g. greater 
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elaborative processing) to affect performance.  Wisco has integrated Williams and 
colleagues (1997) original theory that negativity biases are specific to elaborative 
processes of explicit memory tasks with these recent findings and argues that biases are 
not limited to explicit memory tasks requiring elaborative processing, but rather are 
found in any tasks that require deeper levels of processing and may or may not include 
elaboration. 
Elaborative processing “refers to the creation of associations between a stimulus 
and existing material stored in memory” (Wisco, 2009, p. 384).  This concept is fairly 
similar to the concept of a schema which provides an organized framework of past 
reactions and experiences (Segal, 1988).  In elaborative processing, the more associations 
one makes between a stimulus and existing information in one’s memory, the greater the 
chances are of recalling that stimulus.  Elaborative processing is similar to schematic 
processing, as everyone engages in elaborative processing, but the content retrieved may 
tend to be more negative in depressed individuals and therefore contribute to negativity 
biases.  In reference to negative attentional biases, elaborative processing of the negative 
stimuli may affect attentional allocation causing enhanced vigilance to and impaired 
disengagement from negative information.  Two factors that have been documented to 
play elemental roles in elaborative and /or schematic processing are self-relevance and 
mood congruency. 
Self-relevance. 
 
Self-relevance refers to ideas, concepts, experiences and memories that are 
relevant and/or significant to oneself.  Self-referential information has been thought to 
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enhance elaboration in memory, as the self is a highly familiar and accessible concept 
(Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  This facilitation of processing is 
referred to as the self-referential encoding effect.  Research on the self-referential 
encoding effect has  demonstrated greater recall for negative adjectives that are self- 
relevant than for positive or other self-relevant words for depressed individuals 
(D’Argembeau, Comblain & Van der Linden, 2005; Dozois & Dobson, 2001; Denny & 
Hunt, 1992; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Derry & Kulper, 1981).  For non-depressed 
individuals, the opposite was found, as these individuals tended to recall more positive 
self-relevant adjectives than any other words (Wisco, 2009).  In addition, Wisco noted 
that negativity biases only arose in the self-referential conditions and not in other- 
referential condition.   This further confirms the importance of self-relevance in 
negativity biases in depressed individuals.  Baños, Medin & Pascual (2001) have also 
found a moderating effect of self-relevance on the recall of negative information, where 
preferential recall is enhanced in depressed individuals if the information is self relevant. 
Therefore, although depressed and non-depressed individuals exhibit self-referential 
encoding effects, it seems that content negativity is a factor for depressed individuals. 
Negative adjectives about the self may be more readily activated in schematic processing, 
which may play a factor in the enhanced recall rates.   Johnson, Joorman and Gotlib 
(2004) also found that improved positive recall of positive self referential adjectives was 
associated with improvement in depressive symptoms in a 12 week follow-up.  These 
studies lend further support for the importance of self-relevance in examining cognitive 
biases in depression. 
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In addition, the importance of self-relevance has been well demonstrated in 
explicit self report measures and is evident in the instruments that are used to assess 
cognitive biases.  Many of the assessments that are used to measure aspects of the 
cognitive triad are composed of only self-relevant content.  Haaga, Dyck and Ernst 
(1991) have proposed that the negative views of the future and the world in Beck’s 
cognitive triad are those that are specific to the self, and so are in relation to one’s own 
future and one’s own world.   For example, two commonly used measures to assess 
future views, Beck’s Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester & Trexler, 1974) and 
the Cognitive Triad Questionnaire (Crandell & Chambless, 1986) contain items that are 
specific to one’s own future (include statements in the first person) as opposed to the 
future in general.  Also, McIntosh and Fischer (2000) performed a factor analysis of the 
Cognitive Triad Questionnaire and narrowed it down to one factor they called “self- 
relevant negative attitude” (p. 881).  This suggests that the nature of these negative 
cognitions is defined by self-relevance and supports the hypothesis proposed by Haaga, 
Dyck and Ernst. 
Although negativity biases have been well documented with self relevant 
information in explicit memory tasks, evidence for negativity biases has been mixed in 
implicit memory tasks with few paradigms utilizing self relevant material.  Though recent 
research has documented negativity biases in implicit memory tasks such as lexical 
decision priming, anagram solving and word stem completion tasks, these designs have 
not incorporated self-referential information (Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1994, 1995; 
Rinck & Becker, 2005; Ruiz-Caballero & Gonzalez, 1994, 1997; Watkins et al. 1996). 
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Still, many studies that have utilized depression-specific stimuli and self- referential 
encoding conditions in implicit memory tasks have failed to document biases (Baños, 
Medina & Pascual, 2001; Danion, Kauffman-Muller, Grange, Zimmerman & Greth, 
1995; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Illsley, Moffoott & O’Carroll, 1995; Lim & Kim, 2005; 
Tarsia, Power & Sanavio, 2003; Watkins, Matthews, Williamson & Fuller, 1992). 
In addition to studies focused on memory, research examining attentional biases 
has found negative biases, but at longer stimuli presentation times with stimuli such as 
faces or self- relevant stimuli (words).  For example, Koster et al. (2005) used a 
modification of the exogenous cuing task that examines both engagement to and 
disengagement away from a stimulus developed by Posner (1980).  This task includes the 
presentation of a target in one of two spatial locations on a screen.  Following the target’s 
presentation, a stimulus then replaces either the target’s location (valid trial) or appears in 
the opposite position of the target (invalid trial).  Participants were instructed to respond 
as quickly as possible to indicate the location of the target.  During this task, the target 
presentation time and the target valence is varied across trials.  Therefore, only one 
stimulus is presented on the screen at a given time and attentional maintenance and 
disengagement is calculated by comparing the latency of responses of the emotionally 
valenced valid and invalid trials to those of the neutral trials.  In the first experiment, the 
stimuli for both experiments consisted of negative, positive, and neutral words, with the 
negative words being self referential adjectives associated with loss and failure presented 
for 1500 ms (Koster et al., 2005).  The second experiment was similar to the first, but 
varied word presentation times from 150, to 500 to 1500ms.  The results indicated that 
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both dysphoric and control participants had exhibited faster response times during valid 
trials for negative words in comparison to the neutral words, although there was one 
substantial difference.  The controls also had faster response times with the positive 
words, whereas the dysphoric participants did not.  This effect was replicated in the 
second experiment, but only for the presentation of 1500 ms, suggesting that this bias is 
seen in later stages of information processing with self- relevant stimuli.  These results 
suggest that dysphoric individuals tended to exhibit these biases not in early automatic 
phases of information processing, but after information may be elaborated upon in 
memory and when the information is self-relevant.  Therefore, including self-relevant 
stimuli in future implicit memory paradigms will be important to capture negativity 
biases and to also further examine information processing models of depression (Wisco, 
2009). 
 
Studies have shown that self-referential processing is associated with specific 
neural pathways and engages cognitive resources.  In a study by Gray et al. (2004), the 
amount of cognitive resources associated with processing self-relevant information was 
examined with ERP readings of P300 (amplitude signifies magnitude of attentional 
resources that are engaged).  Participants were presented six words or phrases in blocks 
of information that served as autobiographical categories in three possible presentations 
(total of 93 blocks presented).  During one presentation, the self-relevant target was 
presented among other non-targets.  In another presentation, a red target (word or phrase 
in red letters) was presented among non-targets.  The last presentation included a novel 
random word/phrase among targets.  Participants were instructed to signal if they had 
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seen any red targets during the block presentation.  Results indicated that attentional 
processing was directed at self–relevant information around 500 ms after presentation 
regardless of the item’s relevance to the task.  This offers insight to the attentional 
resources that may play roles in the maintenance of attention, especially when self- 
relevant stimuli are used. 
Neuro-imaging research has also shown increased activation in the medial 
prefrontal cortex during self-referential processing (Wisco, 2009).  Activity in the MPC 
was enhanced when rating self-descriptive adjectives in comparison to other positivity 
ratings, describing others and rating adjectives that described others (e.g. Craik et. al, 
1999; Kelly et al., 2002; Schmitz, Kawarhara-Baccus & Johnson, 2004; Macrae, Moran, 
Heatherton, Banfield & Kelly, 2004).  The brain appears to be processing self-referential 
material differently, which may provide insight into negativity biases seen in depression 
that tend to manifest as thoughts and beliefs that are predominantly self-focused. 
Mood congruency. 
 
Mood congruency is another concept involved in schematic activation where 
mood state has an effect on information processing.  According to the mood congruency 
hypothesis, one’s mood state should facilitate the processing of concurrent mood-related 
information (Bower, 1981).  In terms of schematic activation, the information that 
matches the individual’s mood state should be more accessible and more easily recalled 
with self-referential information intensifying the effect (Segal, 1988).  Research that 
incorporated mood priming (an experimental manipulation to invoke a particular mood 
state such as sadness or happiness in participants) in examining a negativity bias has 
11  
 
 
 
produced mixed results across many different experimental paradigms.  Some studies 
have demonstrated the mood congruent processing bias (Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib & 
Cane, 1987; Ingram & Ritter, 2000; Mogg et al., 1995), while others have not (Hill & 
Dutton, 1989; Mogg, Millar & Bradley, 2000).  Hill and Dutton examined attentional 
biases to self-esteem threatening words in sub-clinically depressed individuals using the 
dot probe computer task.  Words were presented in pairs for 750 ms, with one appearing 
at the top of the screen and the other at the bottom.  Participants were instructed to read 
aloud the word presented at the top and to read to themselves the word at the bottom of 
the screen.  They were then instructed to respond as quickly as possible to indicate when 
a probe appeared on the left side of the screen.  Following the dot probe task, participants 
were administered a recall task.  Results indicated slower responses times overall for the 
depressed group, but no enhanced recall for the threat-related words.  The shorter 
stimulus presentation and differences in methodology for assessing bias scores may have 
contributed to the null findings of this study. 
Mogg, Millar & Bradley (2000) examined attentional biases for sad, threatening 
and happy faces in clinically depressed, anxious and control participants using a dot 
probe design supplemented with eye-tracking equipment to assess initial orienting of 
attention as well.  Results indicated non-significant findings with attentional biases for 
sad faces in depressed individuals when stimuli were presented for 1000ms.  Of the 15 
depressed individuals included in the study, 14 had concurrent anxiety diagnoses. 
Anxious individuals usually exhibit biases for threat related information at shorter 
presentation times, but do not consistently exhibit biases for depression relevant stimuli. 
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Therefore, the comorbidity of these diagnoses may have played a role in attenuating 
biases for sad faces in this study.  Thus, the mixed findings in the literature may be due to 
differences in presentation times, comorbidity of anxiety, and methodological differences 
across experimental paradigms.  Most studies that have documented biases included 
presentation rates >1000ms, lacked clinical rates of anxiety in the samples and used 
similar methodologies for assessing biases. 
Cognitive Processing Summary 
 
In sum, cognitive models suggest that individuals with depression selectively 
attend to the least favorable information and prime activation of negative self schemas 
from that information that may exacerbate and/or maintain depression (e.g. Beck 1976, 
1983, 1987; Ingram, 1984).  Beck also suggests that depressogenic thinking may be a 
function of a diathesis-stress model in which these maladaptive schemas are activated in 
face of negative and/or stressful life events (Beck, 1987).  So, individuals may have a 
plethora of schemas, but maladaptive schemas may be activated in individuals vulnerable 
to depression in the face of stressful events, when the information is self-referential and 
when they are in a depressed mood.  Depressed individuals tend to orient and attend to 
negative information, and dysphoric (mildly depressed) individuals tend to exhibit a 
similar pattern as well (Williams 1996; Koster, 2005), so it seems that mood state may be 
an elemental role in information processing models of negativity biases.  In addition, self- 
relevance has been documented to enhance the effects of elaboration in memory and has 
played important roles in negativity biases.  Neurological evidence suggests that self- 
referential processing involves distinct neural correlates, and that self-referential 
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information may contribute something unique to negativity biases that would not be 
exhibited by other types of stimuli.  Negative attentional biases have been readily 
documented when the stimuli utilized in experimental paradigms are self-relevant. 
Therefore, schematic activation under conditions of depressed/dysphoric mood and self- 
relevance may underlie selective attention to negative information which may result in 
the expression of an attentional bias.  In addition, these negativity biases arise in “deeper 
stages” of information processing which typically occur later in attentional processing 
(>1000ms following stimulus exposure). 
Experimental Paradigms and Attentional Biases 
 
Although explicit memory tasks may offer beneficial information concerning 
responses or outward manifestations of behavior, they offer little insight into the 
underlying mechanisms that may be driving these responses.  Segal (1989) argued that 
explicit memory paper and pencil tasks were inadequate methods for testing schematic 
theories, and advocated for indirect experimentation methods that could control for mood 
based fluctuations and self report issues.  Recent research has begun to address this point, 
utilizing implicit memory paradigms and performance based tasks to examine underlying 
mechanisms of attentional processing.  As discussed previously, research examining 
negativity biases in attention have consistently documented them at longer stimulus 
duration intervals (>1000ms), indicating that these biases arise during later stages of 
processing.   These studies have typically utilized various experimental paradigms 
ranging from emotional Stroop to exogenous cuing tasks to examine attentional biases 
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through latency of response to emotional stimuli. However, the two most commonly 
utilized paradigms are discussed in this brief review. 
The most frequently utilized paradigm for examining an attentional bias is the 
emotional Stroop task with words serving as stimuli.  In this task, emotional and neutral 
words are presented in different colors.  The task is to identify the color in which the 
designated word is presented as quickly as possible, ignoring the content of the word. 
Longer response times to identify the colors of emotional words compared to non- 
emotional words are indicative of an emotion bias.  While some studies have documented 
a bias toward negative emotional words in dysphoric or clinically depressed individuals 
(Dudley, O’Brian, Barnett, McGuckin & Britton, 2002; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib and 
McCann, 1984; Lim & Kim, 2005), some have not (Dalgleish et al., 2003; Grant & Beck, 
2006; Gotlib, Kasch et al., 2004; Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Hill & Knowles, 1991; Yovel 
 
& Mineka, 2004, 2005).  This task requires response suppression, as participants must 
inhibit recalling the presented word in order to name the color.  This may lead to 
unintentional processing of associated semantic information, and may also involve 
differential strategic processing across individuals.  Thus, it may be difficult to 
differentiate whether interference in this task may be a result of encoding or retrieval 
effects (Gotlib, Kasch et al., 2004). 
The other commonly used paradigm is the dot probe task or “attentional probe” 
(Yiend, 2009).  During the dot probe task, two stimuli are presented side by side on a 
monitor for a specified duration of time.  When used to examine attentional biases 
involving emotional stimuli, neutral and emotional words or images are generally 
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presented in pairs for a specified duration on the screen.  Immediately following their 
presentation, a dot will appear in one of the two locations where the previous stimuli 
were presented.   Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to indicate 
the location of the probe by pressing a designated button on the keyboard.  A faster 
response when the probe replaces the location of an emotional stimulus (attentional 
vigilance), and a delayed response when the probe replaces the location of a neutral 
stimulus (attentional avoidance) indicate attentional biases (Yiend, 2009).  This visual 
probe design was adapted by MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) as a paradigm of 
visuo-spatial attention and response time (Mogg & Bradley, 2006).  Within this 
paradigm, engagement of attention can be measured by response times to a visual probe 
(Posner, Snyder & Davidson, 1980).  Stroop tasks work best with words and word 
strings, while dot probe tasks are better designed for pictorial stimuli (e.g. faces, 
pictures). 
Relevant Research Utilizing Dot Probe Design 
 
In many of the previous studies examining the attention bias to negative 
information, words have been used as the stimuli. Researchers have suggested that 
perhaps faces instead of words should be used because of the interpersonal deficits that 
are frequently seen in depression.  Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue & Joorman (2004) 
examined an attentional bias to emotional information in clinically depressed participants 
(diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder), clinically anxious individuals (diagnosed 
with Generalized Anxiety Disorder) and controls using emotional stimuli (happy, sad and 
threatening faces) in a visual probe design.  The stimuli were presented in pairs 
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(emotional with neutral) for a duration of 1000 ms. Results indicated that clinically 
depressed participants oriented towards only sad faces (Gotlib et al., 2004a).   In addition, 
Gotlib, Kasch, Traill, Joorman & Arnow (2004b) examined attentional biases using a 
recall task, dot probe task with faces (sad, angry and happy), and emotional Stroop task in 
clinically depressed, clinically socially anxious and control participants.  Results from the 
dot probe task were comparable to Gotlib et al’s (2004a) other study, with enhanced 
vigilance towards sad stimuli in the depressed group.  Mogg et al. (2000) examined a bias 
using interpersonal stimuli presented for 1000 ms as well.  However, Gotlib et al.’s 
results were not replicated, as no discrimination was found between the depressed and the 
control group.  The results may have been confounded by the co-morbidity of depression 
and anxiety in the depressed group, as Gotlib et al’s studies included a “purely” 
depressed sample while the depressed sample in Mogg et al’s study was not screened for 
anxiety (Mogg et al., 2005).  A bias for happy faces has been found in anxious 
individuals, which may have attenuated the negative attentional biases in the depressed 
group (Mogg et al., 2005). 
Joorman and Gotlib (2007) examined whether or not this bias may be a state 
marker of the depressive episode or a trait-like characteristic of vulnerable individuals. 
The study included a currently depressed group, a formerly depressed group, and a 
control group.  They utilized a dot-probe design and the stimuli consisted of a set of 20 
faces with sad, happy and neutral expressions. Consistent with the notion that attentional 
biases operate in a trait-like manner, they hypothesized that both the formerly depressed 
and the currently depressed would demonstrate a bias toward sad faces in comparison to 
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the control group.  This hypothesis was supported; both the formerly depressed group and 
the currently depressed group selectively attended to sad faces presented for 1000 ms. 
They also found that the controls exhibited biases to orient attention towards the happy 
faces and avoid the sad (Joorman & Gotlib). 
In addition, research has shown negative attentional biases in participants with 
subclinical depressive symptoms.  Shane and Peterson (2007) examined attentional biases 
to emotional information in dysphoric individuals in two studies.  In the first study using 
a dot probe design, the stimuli consisted of 40 positive, 40 negative and 120 neutral 
pictures chosen from the International Affective Picture System database (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005).  The negative stimuli consisted of pictures related to sadness 
and threat.  The dysphoric group showed a tendency to direct attention away from 
positive stimuli, but did not demonstrate a bias toward negative pictures.  Study 2 also 
used dysphoric individuals, but stimuli in the dot probe task consisted of 40 positive, 40 
depression-related and 100 neutral words.  These words were rated and matched on word 
length, arousal and anxiety or depression relevance (Shane & Peterson, 2007).  Results 
showed both a bias away from positive information and a bias towards depression- 
specific stimuli among the dysphoric participants. 
Summary of Findings 
 
So, in terms of the research completed on the negative attentional bias, it has been 
documented when using a priming method in non-dysphoric individuals, self-relevant 
stimuli (faces or self-relevant words), and an increased duration of greater than 1000 ms 
for stimuli presentation (Mogg et. al, 2005).  Research utilizing the dot probe task has 
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only documented biases at presentation times greater than 1000 ms.  Mogg and Bradley 
(2005) found a bias for depressed words presented for 1000 ms, but not at shorter 
presentation times.  Because this bias has been consistently expressed at longer 
presentation times, this indicates a problem not with orienting, but with disengaging 
attention (Bradley et al, 1997).  Posner and Petersen (1990) identified thee subsystems of 
attention orienting: orienting to sensory events, alerting signals, and maintaining a 
vigilant or alert state.  Although the experimental designs discussed above operationalize 
an attentional bias in terms of response latency, they provide only a brief glance of 
attentional processing and are only tapping into the alerting and maintaining phases of 
attention.  In order to measure attentional shifting, eye-movement designs would need to 
be implemented as well. 
Self-Relevance and Attentional Bias 
 
Additional research is needed exploring the role of self relevance and mood 
congruency on disengaging attention in dysphoric, non-dysphoric, and clinically 
depressed individuals.  If individuals are not exhibiting vigilance to certain stimuli or are 
having no problems disengaging from the information, it may be due to the fact that they 
have little or no meaning to the person and the stimuli being processed at a more 
“shallow” level.  Depression can have different effects on different individuals, so it may 
be necessary to choose stimuli that are self-relevant and emotional for each participant. 
Levine and Edelstein (2009) discuss the role of attention “magnets” in memory 
narrowing (enhanced memory for central versus peripheral information), and propose that 
everyday emotional events may lack these highly arousing magnets.  However, these 
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everyday emotional events that are high in personal concern are typically the focus of 
rumination and distorted cognitions.  MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) provided evidence 
for specificity effects in emotional Stroop paradigms, where anxious individuals 
experienced the greatest interference from items high in concern relevance (Mogg et al., 
1989; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985).  These individuals exhibited biases only for threat- 
relevant stimuli, which are salient for anxious individuals. 
In addition, Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (2000) argue that emotionality, concern- 
relevance and mood congruence are three factors that play a role in selective processing. 
They found that self-generated words enhanced the effects seen by selective processing 
and that personal concern elicited a greater bias than emotion ratings (Gilboa- 
Schechtman et al, 2000).  As mentioned earlier, salience of information is elemental in 
schematic activation and selective processing of information, as self-referential 
information influences the ease to which this information is accessible.  Although self 
referential encoding effects have been documented across many experimental paradigms, 
the role self-generated images play in attentional biases has yet to be explored. 
Research has utilized images that have been normed in reference to valence and 
arousal (IAPS images), which has provided further clarification to the role of attentional 
processing in biases and implicated possible underlying neural mechanisms of these 
attentional biases as well (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006; Vogt et al. 2008).  These images are 
typically high in attention magnets (e.g., gore, death), but are not are the content of 
everyday thoughts and worries that may play contributing roles in depressive 
symptomatology.  Therefore, by incorporating stimuli each individual chooses into the 
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experimental design, a high degree of self-relevance should be captured.  Utilizing 
pictorial stimuli that reflect everyday emotional experiences increases ecological validity 
and avoids ambiguities and/or confusions in literal interpretations of words which can be 
advantageous to those who are more visually-oriented (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 
The negative attentional bias has been demonstrated in non-clinical populations, 
which will serve as the target population for this investigation.  Williams et al (1996) 
found no real difference between non-clinical and clinical populations in exhibiting a 
pattern of selective attention.  Depression may be expressed on a continuum of 
functioning, with an arbitrary line drawn between sub-clinical and clinical depression. 
So, examining the bias in dysphoric individuals will provide additional information to the 
processes that may underlie this bias. 
Across many different experimental paradigms, dysphoria has been 
operationalized one of two ways: through naturally occurring dysphoria (including 
individuals scoring above some cutoff on a depression screening measure such as the 
BDI), or by experimentally inducing a mood state in non-dysphoric participants.  In terms 
of the latter, there are several mood induction procedures that have been utilized across 
many different experimental paradigms throughout the years.  Westerman et al. (1994) 
conducted a meta-analysis on the validity of different mood induction techniques.  Their 
results indicated that a combination of music, imagination and film may be effective 
(~75% effectiveness across studies) in inducing negative mood (1994).  Scherrer and 
Dobson (2009) have also indicated the effectiveness of the Velten procedure, where 
participants read self referential statements and are instructed to feel a specific mood. 
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Westerman et al. (1994) also proposed that the purpose of the experiment and the 
instructions provided to re-experience a given mood state may have enhancement effects 
on the efficacy of the mood induction.  Therefore, the mood induction procedure utilized 
by Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000) was chosen for this study. 
The goals of this study were, first, to examine if the mood manipulated dysphoric 
individuals exhibited a negative attentional bias using self-generated pictorial stimuli and, 
second, to examine if gender, priming condition, self-relevance and valence were 
significant predictors of reaction times in negative and positive trials.  Participants were 
asked to take sixty-four pictures of different types of stimuli in their everyday 
environment (16 negative, 16 positive and 32 neutral) and rated these pictures on 
importance and valence. The pictures taken by the participants were included as the 
stimuli in a dot probe paradigm along with participant-rated neutral pictures as fillers in 
the task.  Prior to completing the dot probe attention task, all participants underwent a 
mood manipulation.  The mood manipulation was administered as suggested by Gilboa- 
Schlectman (2000), where participants were read a script and asked to re-live a 
negative/positive experience while listening to music (Beethoven for negative condition 
and Vivaldi for positive condition). It was hypothesized that mood manipulated 
dysphoric individuals would exhibit a significantly greater attentional bias to negative 
stimuli than participants exposed to a positive mood induction when self-generated 
pictures were used in a dot-probe paradigm.  The bias is defined in terms of latency of 
response with the prediction that that there will be delayed responses in trials where the 
probe replaces the position of a non-negative stimulus, and faster responses when the 
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probe replaces the position of the negative stimulus.  It was also hypothesized that self- 
relevance (importance ratings of pictures) and valence would be significant predictors of 
reaction times in dysphoric individuals.  Specifically, individuals would exhibit longer 
response latencies to negative pictures when the pictures were more important and 
emotional to them.  In addition, gender was included as an independent variable in both 
hypotheses for exploratory reasons, as gender may play roles in the processing of 
emotional information in relation to interpretation and reactivity (Cahill, 2006).   Given 
the current study design, it may be informative to examine the role gender may play in 
attentional biases when using self-generated photographs. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHOD 
 
 
 
Participants 
 
Participants consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses 
at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  Participants signed up for the 
experiment through a computerized registration system.  One hundred and one students 
were consented for the study and 57 were included in the primary statistical analyses 
including only low BDI (BDI < 6) participants (7 excluded for technical 
problems/incomplete data and 21 dropped out prior to completion of the entire study). 
The low BDI sample consisted of Caucasian (52.6%), African American (31.6%), Asian 
(7%), Hispanic (5.3%) and racially identified other (3.5%) UNC-G students with a mean 
age of 19.51 (SD = 1.992, range = 18-26).  Inclusionary criteria included a BDI score of 6 
or lower at the second visit prior to the mood manipulation and computer task.   Sixteen 
participants scored high on the BDI, but were permitted to complete the study for class 
requirements.  Additional information regarding low BDI participant characteristics is 
provided in Table 1.  Although the goal of this study was to examine attentional biases 
using self-generated pictures in a non-dysphoric sample, 16 participants with high BDIs 
completed the study for class requirements.  The high BDI sample (N=16) consisted of 
African-American (62.5%), Caucasian (25%), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
(6.3%) and racially identified other (6.3%) UNC-G students with a mean age of 20.13 
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(SD = 4.689, range = 18-37). 
 
Materials 
 
Demographics/past history.  A questionnaire was administered to 
gather demographics information such as age, ethnicity and income. 
BDI (Beck Depression Inventory).  This questionnaire was used to assess the 
severity of depressive symptomatology.  The BDI has demonstrated reliability and 
validity (Beck 1976, 1988) and has been recognized to tap features that map onto 
clinical depression as defined by the DSM-IV TR criteria.  The BDI asks questions in 
reference to the domains of the somatic, emotional and cognitive domains of depression. 
Participants are asked to answer 21 questions in reference to how they have been feeling 
in the past week including that day.  Each question is on a scale of 0-3, with highest 
possible score being 63.  According to the recommendations of the BDI for use with 
non- clinical samples by Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen & Ingram (1987), a proposed 
a cut off score of 6 or lower was used as inclusionary criteria for data analysis since this 
experimental paradigm included a mood induction procedure.  For this study, the 
documented internal consistency for the BDI was good (Cronbach’s α=.84). 
STAI (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory).  Both state and trait versions of the 
State and Trait Anxiety Inventory are measures of anxiety to assess trait and state 
anxiety characteristics. High levels of anxiety may have a confounding effect on the 
data, and must be considered in data interpretation.  The STAI has documented 
reliability and validity (Spielberger et. al, 1983).  The internal consistency for this study 
was good for the STAI-State (Cronbach’s α=.88) and excellent for the STAI-Trait 
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(Cronbach’s α=.92). 
 
Visual analogue scales.  Three visual analogue scales were administered prior to 
and following the mood induction procedure, following the computer task, and 
immediately after the happy mood induction that followed the computer task to serve as 
a manipulation check for depressed mood. These scales will assess sad, happy and 
anxious mood states and will range from 0-100%, asking the participant how he/she feels 
right at that moment (Bradley et al., 1997).  An additional scale was included to assess 
overall affect (0 denoting very negative affect and 100 denoting an extremely positive 
mood). However, this scale proved to be psychometrically problematic, and was not 
included in statistical analyses. 
Rating scales.  Two rating scales were completed for each picture after the 
participant has taken the pictures.  One rating scale served as measure of emotional 
valence where participants were shown the picture and asked how emotional the image 
was to them.  Participants responded on a scale of -5 to 5 (-5 extremely negative, -4 very 
negative, -3 moderately negative, -2 somewhat negative, -1 slightly negative, 0 neutral, 1 
slightly positive, 2 somewhat positive, 3 moderately positive, 4 very positive, 5 
extremely positive).  After rating the valence of the image, participants then provided a 
brief description concerning the reason the image was emotional to them as well.  The 
second scale assessed the importance of the image to the participants.  Participants were 
shown the image and asked “How important is this image to you?” Participants 
responded on a scale of 1-4 (1=not at all important, 2=somewhat important, 
3=moderately important and 4=very important). 
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Stimuli.  Stimuli consisted of pictures taken by participants a week prior to their 
completion of the computer task.  Participants were instructed to take 16 negative 
images,16 positive images and 32 neutral images.  Participants were provided with 
instructions of how to use the camera and the appropriate pictures to include in the 
experiment.  In addition, numerous examples of each type of stimulus to photograph 
(negative, positive and neutral) were provided and participants were required to provide 
3 examples of each stimulus type in session.  Experimenters offered support and 
clarification to assist in the selection of pictures throughout the experiment as well. 
Participants received emails with further examples and were required to review their 
pictures with the experimenters prior to incorporation of their pictures into the computer 
task.  If pictures were inappropriate, blurry, out of focus, or did not elicit strong emotions 
within the individuals upon review, participants were provided with more time to re-take 
more appropriate pictures that were discussed and approved by the experimenter. 
Following the capture of stimuli, the 64 images were then uploaded into the dot probe 
computer task.  A subset of 32 pictures of neutral images that were rated as low valence 
by the participant were included from a pool of 80 participant-generated images as fillers 
in the computer task.  In terms of pairings, there were 16 pairs of an emotional stimulus 
(positive or negative) and a neutral stimulus, all of which were images taken by the 
participant.  Sixteen pairs of neutral- neutral pairs that participants rated as neutral from 
the participant generated neutral picture pool, were included as fillers in the experimental 
design as well.  The order and presentation of the images were randomized for each 
participant.  All stimuli pairs were presented 4 times, for a total of 192 trials.  The order 
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of the stimuli pairs was randomized for each participant and the presentation of the 
images were randomized within each pair. The location of the probe and stimuli were 
counterbalanced, so participants saw an equal number of probes and emotional pictures 
on the right and left sides of the screen. 
Attention task.  A dot probe study design served as the attention task in the 
proposed study.  The dot probe task was run using the computer program Eprime on a 
Dell Optiplex 755 desktop computer.  Two stimuli (512 x 384) were presented side 
by side on the monitor for 1200 ms.  Immediately following their presentation, a 72 
point size dot appeared in the center of one of the two locations where the previous 
stimuli were presented.   Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible to indicate the location of the probe by pressing a designated button on the 
SR response box. 
Mood priming task.  The mood priming method adapted from the study by 
 
Gilboa-Schlectman et al (2000) was used to induce dysphoric and positive mood in 
 
non- dysphoric participants. Participants in the negative mood-induced condition were 
first instructed to follow the “relive” instructions by Salovey (1992).  They were then 
instructed to concentrate on their feelings as they heard Beethoven’s spring quartet 
op131 for five minutes.  After participants completed the computer task, they were 
instructed again to follow the “relive” instructions by Salovey for a positive memory as 
they heard Vivaldi’s “Spring” concerto of the “Four Seasons” op. 12.  Individuals in 
positive priming condition followed these instructions as well, but heard Vivaldi’s 
Spring Concerto both preceding and following the computer task. 
28  
 
 
 
Procedures 
 
The present study was conducted in a psychology research lab at the UNC- 
G. This study examined the attentional bias in induced dysphoria and included non- 
dysphoric students which were randomly assigned to a positive priming and 
negative mood priming condition. 
Screening for inclusion. Participants were recruited through Experimetrix, a 
psychology experiment sign-up system.  Participants were screened by age (must have 
been 18 or older), English language comprehension (must have been able to speak and 
read English) and visual impairment (no visual impairments other than corrective 
vision). In addition, participants who scored above a 6 on the BDI were not included in 
the final sample. 
Study experimental protocol. 
 
Consent and acquiring stimuli.  Students who have signed up through 
experimetrix came to the lab for initial consent for participation in the study and were 
randomly assigned to a positive mood or negative mood priming condition.  They 
completed the BDI and STAI and rated 80 participant-generated neutral pictures. 
Participants were given a digital camera and detailed instructions on how to use the 
camera and the types of pictures to take.  Students were given a week to take 16 
pictures of negative stimuli, 16 pictures of positive stimuli, and 32 pictures of neutral 
stimuli. Students practiced using the camera in the lab and were provided with 
instructions of what images (content and quality) are appropriate for the study.  These 
instructions were an attempt to ensure that the images would be in concordance with all 
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Institutional Review Board regulations.  Participants could not include photographs of 
people (unless publicly accessible) or photographs that included nudity.  Participants 
were also instructed to avoid taking photographs in situations that would place 
themselves or others in harm (e.g., someone robbing a bank, shooting or fighting), and 
were not allowed to take pictures of people other than themselves.  Any images that 
were deemed inappropriate were not included in the study.  Students were also provided 
with examples of appropriate stimuli as probes to assist them in the task as well.  For 
the negative stimuli, participants were instructed to take five to six images of stimuli 
that elicit sadness or dysphoria.  This was a manipulation to attempt to capture salient 
information to depression, as dysphoria is commonly one of the main features of 
depression.  Other studies have also attempted to use mood congruent stimuli as well 
(e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 1995), although none have 
implemented the previously described strategy. 
Incorporating stimuli into the dot probe task. Participants returned the camera 
back to the lab within a week from the time of consent. The pictures the participant 
captured were uploaded onto the computer, along with 32 of the previously rated 
neutral images.  Sixty-four stimuli were then incorporated into the dot probe 
experiment through the computer program Eprime for each participant (16 self- 
generated negative, 16 self- generated positive, 32 self-generated neutrals and 32 
experimenter-provided neutrals that were presented in pairs of 16 negative-neutral, 16- 
positive-neutral and 16 neutral-neutral as fillers). 
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Completing the dot probe task.  Participants returned to the lab for their final visit 
after returning the camera.  All participants completed the BDI, STAI, and VAS scales.  
In both priming conditions, the mood induction procedure was completed, and then was 
followed by administration of the VAS scales as a manipulation check for assessing 
mood.  Participants were seated 70 inches from the computer screen. Participants were 
instructed to read instructions presented on the computer screen and then were positioned 
appropriately with the SR response box (right index finger positioned on the right-most 
button and left index finger positioned on the left-most button).  Instructions were 
verbally reviewed again and participants were instructed to respond and quickly and 
accurately as possible for the entire duration of the task. Participants then began practice 
trials of stimuli that consisted of geometric shapes in an attempt to control for valence 
and/or arousal effects during practice trials.   Participants completed these practice trials 
for 30 seconds and were asked if they would like to repeat the practice trials or if they 
were ready to begin the task.  All stimuli were presented for 
1200 ms, with a dot probe presentation of 300 milliseconds.  Upon completion of the 
task, participants were provided with the VAS scales to assess mood.  Both conditions 
then completed the positive mood priming procedure and were administered the VAS 
scales again to ensure their mood has been stabilized (happy rating returned to within 20 
points of baseline). Following the positive mood priming procedure, they completed the 
rating scales in reference to each picture they provided.  Following these ratings, they 
were thoroughly debriefed as to the purpose of study and issues of confidentiality were 
also discussed again. 
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Statistical Method 
 
A power analysis was computed a priori using the computer program G*Power to 
determine the size of the sample that would be needed to see a medium effect.  The a 
priori power analysis was completed for multiple regression (omnibus) with alpha set at 
.05.  For a medium effect size and power of .80 for four predictors, the total sample size 
needed was 68 participants. 
In order to eliminate the influence of outliers, response times less than 100 
milliseconds and greater than 2000 milliseconds were removed from analyses.   In 
addition, incorrect responses were not included in analyses as well.  Average reaction 
times were calculated separately for each stimulus type and type of trial (valid and 
invalid).  Valid trials are when the probe replaces a negative stimulus and invalid is when 
the probe replaces a non-negative stimulus. 
Attentional bias scores were computed using the following equation (Mogg et 
al., 1995; Gotlib et al., 2004; Bradley et al., 1997): ½[(RpLe-RpRe)+(LpRe-Lple)] 
where R=right position, L=left position, p=probe and e=emotion (negative, positive or 
neutral). Positive values indicated attention towards emotional stimuli and away from 
neutral, and a negative value indicated attention away from emotional stimuli (Gotlib et 
al., 2004). 
Study Hypotheses 
 
To test the hypothesis that participants who underwent negative mood 
priming would exhibit an attentional bias (positive score or enhanced vigilance) for 
negative information, a 2 (Group: positive and negative condition) X 2 (Sex: female 
32  
 
 
 
and male) MANOVA was conducted on the emotional bias scores (positive and 
negative).  Secondly, to assess if importance and valence were significant predictors 
of reaction times in negative and positive trials controlling for gender, a 1 Way 
Random Effects ANCOVA was conducted in HLM.  As stated earlier, the inclusion 
of gender in all these statistical analyses was completely exploratory. 
Traditional regression analyses include multiple assumptions which may be 
compromised by the nested data in this study (responses at multiple time points within 
individuals). Therefore, in order to assess the relationships among the variables in this 
study, it was necessary to use a statistical method that accounts for the inherent 
dependency among response time data from multiple time points within individuals. 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) assesses relationships between and within 
variables using nested data structured in levels within hierarchical frameworks 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  HLM offers enhanced hypothesis testing by taking into 
account that variables such as response time latencies may be similar within and across 
individuals; furthermore, HLM can assess cross-level effects of nested data with greater 
accuracy than other statistical methods for nested designs (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
This project includes nested data (responses within individuals) and some instances of 
missing data; therefore HLM was utilized to test the aforementioned hypotheses 
concerning importance and valence ratings and response time latency.  Please see model 
below and note that those variables names appearing in bold and italics were grand-mean 
centered. 
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Level-1 Model 
 
 
RTij = β1j (NEGTRIALij)+ β2j (POSTRIALij)+ β3j (PROBETYPEij)+ 
 
 
β4j(VALRATINij)+β5j IMPRATINij)+ rij 
 
Level-2 Model 
 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (PRIMECON) + γ12 (GEND_REC) + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (PRIMECON) + γ22 (GEND_REC) + u1j 
β3j  = γ30 + γ31 (PRIMECON) + γ32 (GEND_REC) + u1j 
β4j = γ10 + γ41 (PRIMECON) + γ42 (GEND_REC) 
β5j= γ50 + γ51 (PRIMECON) + γ54 (GEND_REC) 
 
Level 1 predictors in this model constitute the nested data (information that 
corresponds to each response of the individual during the computer task).  The variables 
included in this level 1 model included the type of stimulus presented (negative or 
positive), the position of the probe (replaced emotional or neutral picture), and the 
importance and valence ratings of the emotional picture included in each trial.  While 
level 1 variables indicate responses within each individual, level 2 predictors correspond 
to variables that identify the individuals in this study.  The variables of interest for this 
model were the priming condition of the participant (negative or positive) and their 
gender (female or male). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Demographic and Participant Characteristics 
 
The primary analyses including low BDI participants included 57 participants: 27 
participants (10 male, 17 females) in the positive mood condition and 30 (9 male, 21 
females) in the negative mood condition. All demographic and participant characteristics 
for low BDI completed participants are included in Table 1.  The conditions did not 
differ significantly in respect to age t (55) = -.362, p>.05, race χ2(4, 57) = 2.38, p >.05, 
and gender χ2(1, 57)=.32, p >.05  However, the two conditions differed significantly in 
respect to STAI-State scores [t(44.26 ) = -3.3, p<.0, d = -.15] and STAI-Trait scores 
[t(55) = -2.267, p <.05, d = -.08].  Although these differences are statistically significant, 
they are not within the clinical range for anxiety. Therefore, STAI scores were not 
included in statistical analyses. 
Separate analyses were conducted including the high BDI participants.  These 
analyses included the 57 low BDI participants plus the 16 participants with BDI scores 
above the cutoff of 6.  This secondary sample included 73 participants: 36 in the positive 
mood condition (15 male, 21 female) and 37 in the negative mood condition (9 male, 28 
female). The conditions did not differ significantly in respect to age [t (71) = .57, p > 
.05], race [χ2(5, 73) = 3.71, p >.05], and gender [χ2(1, 73)=2.49 p >.05].  However, the 
 
two conditions differed significantly in respect to STAI-State scores [t(65.91) = -3.14, p 
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< .01 d= -.10].  Again, though these differences are statistically significant, they are not 
within the clinical range for anxiety.  Therefore, STAI scores were not included in 
statistical analyses. 
Participant Importance and Valence Ratings 
 
First, an Independent Samples t-test was conducted on the primary sample to 
examine whether importance and valence ratings for negative and positive pictures 
differed in the two priming conditions.  The conditions did not differ significantly in 
ratings of importance for positive [t(55) =-1.442, p>.05] and negative pictures [t(55) = 
.062, p>.05].  Although the conditions did not differ significantly on valence ratings for 
positive pictures [t(55) = -.020, p>.05], they did differ significantly in respect to valence 
ratings for negative pictures [t(55) = 2.733, p <.01, d = .10].  Participants in the negative 
mood condition rated negative pictures as more negative on average than participants in 
the positive mood condition.  An Independent Samples t-test was conducted to examine 
gender differences in ratings as well.  Results indicated that females rated negative and 
positive pictures both as more important [tneg imp(55) = -2.07, p<.05, d= -.07; t 
posimp(29.196) = -2.06, p>.05, d= -.07] and rated positive pictures as more positive [t(55) 
= -2.04, p<.05, d= -.07].  However, there were no significant differences between males 
 
and females in ratings of emotionality for the negative pictures [t(55) = 1.598, p<.05]. 
Secondary analyses were conducted on the combined low/high BDI sample as well.  The 
Independent Samples t-test examining importance and valence ratings for negative and 
positive pictures in the two priming conditions showed the same results.  Conditions did 
not differ significantly in ratings of importance for positive [t(71) =-.147, p>.05] and 
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negative pictures [t(71) = -1.155, p > .05].  Although the conditions did not differ 
significantly on valence ratings for positive pictures [t(71) = -.575, p > .05], they did 
differ significantly in respect to valence ratings for negative pictures [t(71) = 3.056, p 
<.01, d=..09].  Consistent with the low BDI sample, participants in the negative mood 
condition rated negative pictures as more negative on average than participants in the 
positive mood condition. The Independent Samples t-test including gender indicated that 
females rated only positive pictures as more important [t(33.414) = -2.19, p<.05, d= - 
.13], and positive pictures as more positive as well [t(71) = -2.08, p<.05, d= -.06].  There 
were no significant differences in reference to the importance or emotionality of the 
negative pictures between males and females [tneg imp(71) = -1.40, p>.05, t negval(71) = - 
1.31, p > .05] 
 
Validity of Experimental Mood Manipulation 
 
Participants were administered an experimental mood manipulation prior to 
completing the dot probe task.  To examine the effects of the mood manipulation, two 
separate Repeated Measures t-tests were conducted with both conditions on the sadness 
and happiness ratings at baseline and following the mood induction.   Low BDI 
participants in the negative mood priming condition experienced a significant increase in 
sadness [t(29) = -8.624, p<.001, d= .59] and decrease in happiness [t(29) = 9.19, p<.001, 
d=.63]. Participants in the positive mood induction experienced a significant increase in 
happiness [t(29) = -4.051, p<.001, d= -.28] and decrease in sadness [t(29) = 2.164, p<.05, 
d= .15].  Refer to Table 4 for estimates of group means and standard deviations. A 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted on the sadness and happiness ratings 
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including gender and condition as the fixed effects.  Results indicated no significant 
effects for gender. 
The high BDI participants displayed a similar pattern as well, although their 
baseline happiness ratings were lower (Mpos= 61.67, SD = 15.41; Mneg = 62.86, SD = 
12.2) than the low BDI sample (Mpos = 83.70, SD = 10.06; Mneg = 82.17, SD = 10.23). 
 
Their baseline sadness ratings were higher (Mpos= 38.33, SD = 27.27; Mneg = 26.43. SD = 
 
16.51) than the low BDI sample (Mpos = 6.58, SD = 10.04; Mneg = 13.00, SD = 21.07). 
Consistent with the low BDI sample, the participants in the positive mood condition 
experienced an increase in happiness (Mpos1= 61.67, SD = 15.41; Mpos2 = 75.00, SD = 
17.68) and decrease in sadness (Mpos1= 38.33, SD = 27.27; Mpos2 = 20.56. SD = 20.38). 
 
The negative mood condition showed an increase in sad mood (Mneg 1= 26.43. SD = 16.5; 
 
Mneg 2= 53.57 SD = 31.45) and decrease in happy mood (Mneg 1= 62.86. SD = 12.2; Mneg 
 
2= 44.29. SD = 20.09).   These results were consistent with the low BDI findings reported 
previously. 
Data Screening 
 
Participant response times on the dot probe computer task that were less than 
 
100ms or greater than 1000ms were excluded from data analyses (2 trials that 
accounted for .0% of data) to minimize the effect of outliers (Gotlib et al, 2004a).  In 
addition, incorrect responses were removed from data analyses (Leyman, De Raedt, 
Schact & Koster, 2007).  These erroneous responses account for .7% of data (64 trials). 
After removal of these trials, data analyses were then completed on 99.3% of the data. 
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Hypothesis 1: Group Differences in Bias Scores 
 
In order to examine group differences in gender and priming condition in 
 
positive and negative bias scores, a 2 (Group: positive and negative condition) X 2 (Sex: 
female and male) MANOVA was conducted on the emotional bias scores (positive and 
negative) of the low BDI sample.  There were no significant effects of gender in 
predicting negative bias scores [F(1, 53) = .756, p >.05] or positive bias scores [F (1, 53) 
= .009, p >.05].  Main effects for mood priming condition on negative [F (1, 52) = .354, 
p >.05] and positive attentional biases [F (1, 53) = .035, p >.05] were non-significant as 
well.  However, the interaction of priming condition and gender showed a trend towards 
significance with negative bias scores [F(1, 53) = 3.16, p= .081], but not for positive 
bias scores [F (1, 53) = .65, p>.05].  Refer to Tables 5 and 7 and Figure 1 for estimated 
parameters. 1 
 
A 2 (Group: positive and negative condition) X 2 (Sex: female and male) 
MANOVA was conducted on the emotional bias scores (positive and negative) including 
the high BDI participants as well.  There were no significant effects of gender in 
predicting negative bias scores [F(1, 70) = .069, p >.05] or positive bias scores [F (1, 70) 
= .002, p >.05].  Main effects for mood priming condition on negative [F (1, 52) = .176, p 
 
>.05] and positive attentional biases [F (1, 53) = .019, p >.05] were non-significant as 
well.  Although the interaction showed a trend towards significance in the primary low 
1 An ANCOVA was conducted on the bias scores including gender and priming condition 
 
as fixed effects and STAI-State scores as a covariate.  Results showed that the addition of 
the covariate did not change the results reported here. 
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BDI sample, it was non-significant for both negative bias scores [F(1, 70) = 3.61, p= 
 
.081], and positive bias scores [F (1, 53) = .743, p>.05] in the sample including both low 
and high BDI participants. 
Hypothesis 2: Effects of Importance and Valence on Reaction Time 
 
In order to examine the effects of participant ratings of valence and importance 
 
on reaction time, and to explore possible gender effects, a random effects ANCOVA was 
conducted using HLM.  For the primary low BDI sample, results indicated that gender 
was found to be a significant predictor in reaction times for negative trials (γ12= 47.96, 
t(52)=2.816,  p < .01) and positive trials (γ22= 40.20 t(52) = 2.626,  p<.05).  These results 
indicate that reaction times vary significantly for males and females for positive and 
negative trials (refer to Table 6 for model fixed effects).   Coefficients of gender were 
then examined to assess whether males or females had greater reaction times on average 
for negative trials.  For coding of sex, males corresponded to a value of zero and females 
were assigned a value of 1.  The coefficient was positive (γ12= 47.96) for negative trials, 
indicating that on average females had longer response times (47.96 point increase in 
slope) in comparison to the males.  For positive trials, the coefficient was also positive 
(γ22= 40.20), indicating again that females on average had longer response times than 
males (40.20 increase in slope). 
However, the results with the full sample of low and high BDI participants 
yielded different findings.  Findings indicated only a trend towards significance for 
gender as a significant predictor of reaction time for positive trials (γ21= 26.35 t(69) = 
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1.82, p = .07).   Thus, these results suggest that females  on average  have longer response 
times than males on positive trials (26.35  increase  in intercept  in comparison to males). 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study examined attentional biases for positive and negative information 
 
using photographs that participants provided and identified as emotional and important to 
them.  Specifically, this study aimed to examine the role of self-relevance in attentional 
biases to emotional information using a novel experimental design that required 
participants to take pictures of stimuli in the environment that were important to them and 
elicited strong negative, positive and neutral emotions.  These pictures served as the 
stimuli for the current study and were incorporated into a dot probe computer task that 
was administered to healthy college students (BDI ≤ 6) who underwent an experimental 
mood manipulation (negative or positive). 
It was hypothesized that participants in the negative mood manipulation condition 
would exhibit significantly different bias scores for negative information than participants 
in the positive mood manipulation condition.   This hypothesis was not confirmed, as 
results indicated no significant differences between the two conditions.  Secondly, it was 
hypothesized that the importance and valence ratings of the pictures would significantly 
predict the participants’ response times (participants would take longer to respond when 
pictures were important and emotional to them).  This hypothesis was not supported. 
However, reaction times on negative and positive trials were found to be significantly 
different between males and females, with females responding slower on average on both 
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types of trials.  The current study included no predictions regarding gender, but an 
exploratory analysis of gender effects on the bias scores indicated a near significant 
interaction of gender and priming condition on negative bias scores in the low BDI 
sample.  Males in the positive priming condition showed attention towards negative 
information, but males in the negative priming condition exhibited attention away from 
negative pictures.  Females tended to show the opposite result, exhibiting attention away 
from negative information in the positive condition, and slightly towards negative 
information in the negative condition. 
Gender has not been explored extensively in the attentional bias literature. 
However, a couple of recent studies have examined gender effects.  Baert, DeRaedt and 
Koster (2010) initially included gender as a predictor in their statistical analyses 
examining attentional biases; however, gender was dropped from the final model due to 
the absence of significant gender effects.  In addition, Vogt, DeHower, Koster, Van 
Damme and Crombez (2008) examined attentional biases for emotional information 
using IAPs pictures.  They reported an interaction between arousal ratings and response 
latency in the female participants, as the females responded faster with pictures that were 
more highly arousing.  Although this indicates a difference in information processing for 
arousing pictures in females, they did not find gender differences in response time per se. 
The females in the current study responded slower than the males on average, and the 
findings related to arousal cannot be addressed as arousal was not assessed for the 
pictures.  However, the males and females in the current study exhibited differential 
patterns of responding to negative and positive pictures.  In addition, there were 
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significant gender differences on importance and valence ratings. Females tended to rate 
positive and negative pictures as more important, and also rated positive pictures as more 
positive than  males.  Though there were significant gender effects for ratings, there were 
no gender effects for the mood induction.  Thus, both males and females responded 
equally well to the mood manipulation. 
Although gender has not been extensively explored in previous research on 
attentional biases, the exploratory findings of this study implicate its possible 
significance.  Cahill (2006) reported findings implicating the role of gender in the 
processing of emotional information.  His results indicated that women rated unpleasant 
pictures as more arousing and responded with greater EMG activity, while men rated 
pleasant stimuli as more pleasant and responded with greater physiological arousal 
(Bradley et al., 2001; Bradley & Lang, 2007).  Therefore, given these differences in 
interpretation and reactivity to valenced material, it seems informative to examine gender 
effects or at the very least, control for the effects of gender when examining attentional 
biases using emotional information in the future. 
As stated previously, the inclusion of gender as a predictor in the MANOVA 
analyses on attentional bias scores was purely exploratory, and based on the observation 
of significant gender effects in the picture ratings in this sample.  The tendency to exhibit 
attention away from negative information shown by the experimentally induced 
dysphoric males is inconsistent with findings in the extant literature.  Dysphoric and 
depressed individuals generally exhibit a bias towards negative information, while non- 
dysphoric individuals exhibit a bias away (protective bias) from negative information 
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(Shane & Petersen, 2007).  Non-depressed individuals tend to exhibit this protective bias, 
where they avoid negative information (Leyman et al., 2007).   It is interesting that the 
males exhibited this pattern in the negative mood manipulation condition, whereas the 
females demonstrated a slight bias towards negative information.  However, females in 
the positive mood condition demonstrated the protective bias that is consistently shown 
with non-dysphoric individuals in past research.  There were a relatively low number of 
males included in the study, so these results require replication with a larger sample.  In 
addition, there was a high degree of variability in the bias scores across individuals in 
both conditions.  Therefore, the high variability in responses compounded with the small 
sample size of this study may have played contributing roles in detecting what may be a 
very small effect.  These inconsistencies within priming conditions suggest that 
attentional biases may operate differently with mood-induced dysphoria than it does with 
naturally occurring dysphoria. 
When the participants with BDI scores higher than the cut-off (above 6) were 
included in statistical analyses, these gender effects disappeared.  The interaction of 
gender and priming condition on negative bias scores no longer approached significance, 
and the gender effect demonstrated with negative trials in the low BDI sample was no 
longer significant.  This indicates that these initial effects demonstrated with the non- 
dysphoric group may be unreliable, or alternatively as previously suggested, that 
attentional biases may operate differently with non-dysphoric and dysphoric individuals. 
Unfortunately, this issue cannot be fully addressed with the current full sample due to the 
low number of high BDI individuals (N=16) and the limited number of males (N=4). 
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Most research utilizing designs (dot probe paradigm) similar to the current study 
has not included induced dysphoric participants.  However, there is one study by Bradley, 
Mogg and Lee that has (1997).  Bradley, Mogg and Lee examined attentional biases for 
negative information in induced and naturally occurring dysphoria.  Results indicated that 
mood induced individuals showed vigilance for negative information only at presentation 
times of 500ms, but not at 1000ms or at 14ms when masking was used.  They also 
documented attentional biases for naturally occurring dysphoria at 1000ms in Study 2, 
and these biases correlated with the self-report measures of depression (Mogg, Bradley & 
Lee, 1997).  Thus, it seems that there may be fundamental differences in attentional 
processing in induced and naturally occurring dysphoria.  Dysphoric and depressed 
individuals generally do not exhibit negative attentional biases at durations < 1000ms, so 
Bradley, Mogg and Lee’s finding is also inconsistent with the majority of attentional bias 
literature (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Gotlib et. al., 2004a; Gotlib et al., 2004b).  This 
indicates that mood congruency may be an adequate but not necessary component of 
negative attentional biases and questions of the reliability of attentional biases in general. 
Negative attentional biases are proposed to arise in later stages of information processing 
where negative schemata are activated and attention is subsequently directed towards 
negative information.  This effect is supposedly enhanced under conditions of mood 
congruency and self-relevancy.  However, the current study utilized both mood 
congruency and self relevant stimuli, and did not find evidence of attentional biases in the 
induced dysphoric individuals.  Furthermore, results including induced dysphoric 
participants were not convergent across similar experimental paradigms.  This further 
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implicates functional differences between induced dysphoric and naturally occurring 
individuals and/or conceptual flaws in the theoretical rationale for negativity biases. 
However, there are factors that were not included in the present design that may 
have contributed to these findings.  A factor that is proposed to play an elemental role in 
negative attentional biases is depressive cognitions (Baert, De Raedt & Koster, 2010).  As 
stated earlier, previous research has demonstrated enhanced vigilance, maintained 
attention towards, and impaired disengagement away from negative information across a 
variety of experimental paradigms in naturally occurring dysphoric and depressed 
individuals (e.g. Baert, De Raedt & Koster; Koster et al, 2005; Mogg et al, 2004).   Baert, 
De Raedt and Koster suggest that the cognitive aspects associated with depression (e.g. 
cognitive distortions, negative views of self, guilt) play elemental roles in attentional 
biases towards negative information. A majority of studies documenting negative 
attentional biases has included dysphoric or depressed participants and has utilized self- 
relevant or interpersonally related information presented at longer presentation times (e.g. 
Koster et al, 2005; Mogg et al., 1995; Gotlib et al, 2004; Bradley et al., 1997).  Therefore, 
attentional biases may stem from the elaboration of negative information (thoughts, 
events) in memory that may be further enhanced by mood congruency and self-relevance. 
Leyman, De Raedt, Schact and Koster (2007) suggest that attentional biases emerge in 
later stages of elaborative processing where negative schemata are activated, which 
subsequently “guides attention”.  In addition, Yovel and Mineka (2004) contend that 
attentional biases are unreliable in sub-clinical populations that may lack these depressive 
cognitive symptoms. 
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Although this study incorporated self-relevant stimuli and mood congruency via a 
mood manipulation, the participants in this study lacked the depressive cognitive 
characteristics exhibited by dysphoric and depressed individuals.  If negative attentional 
biases are contingent upon the presence of at least some minimal depressive cognitions 
(e.g. self-criticism, worthlessness, guilt), non-significant findings with a sample of 
healthy college students would be expected (Baert, De Raedt & Koster, 2010).  In 
addition, Baert, De Raedt & Koster suggest that attentional biases and depressive 
symptom severity are correlated, so the extent that attentional biases will be expressed 
increases as severity of depressive cognitive symptomatology increases as well.  This 
theoretical rationale provides justification for null findings in relation to attentional 
biases; however, it offers insufficient explanations for the results of the current study and 
Mogg, Bradley and Lee’s study (1997).  High BDI participants in the current study 
tended to display different patterns of responses in comparison with the low BDI 
participants.  Males in the high BDI group tended to show attention away from negative 
information in the positive mood condition and females displayed the opposite effect, 
showing attention towards negative information. The high BDI negative mood condition 
included only females and trended towards attention away from negative information. 
These findings are inconsistent with low BDI results and past research as well.  However, 
high BDI sample sizes were extremely low (Npos=8, Nneg=7), so reliable conclusions 
cannot be made. 
It is possible that the operationalization of self relevance for the current study has 
differential effects on attentional processing than previously utilized self-relevant stimuli 
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in other experimental paradigms, or that the pictures included in this study were not valid 
indicators of self concern and emotionality.  Participants were instructed to provide 
pictures of stimuli that were meaningful and elicited strong emotional reactions within 
themselves.  The inclusion of pictures the participants provided was a manipulation 
intended to ensure the stimuli included were high in personal concern, and also were 
indicators of everyday stimuli.  The pictures provided by participants ranged from objects 
to publicly assessable images of people/events, and elicited a range of emotions 
(negative, positive, neutral) from the participants.  Therefore, pictures within and across 
participants had high variability in their content and emotionality (some included more 
fear or anxiety provoking than depression specific).  In addition, extremely negative 
emotion-evoking stimuli may be difficult to identify in non-dysphoric individuals.  Even 
after stimuli were identified, their importance can be transient and in the past.  Therefore, 
the variability reflected in the content and in the participants’ responses to the pictures 
may have played contributing roles in the results and the differential attentional 
processing exhibited by the participants. 
Although these stimuli were high in personal concern, they lacked the “attention 
magnets” present in other pictorial stimuli such as IAPs photographs that have been used 
to examine attentional biases in depression and dysphoria.  As stated previously, it has 
been suggested that these pictures contain attentional magnets, which are proposed to 
enhance memory but typically are not the content of depressive cognitions and 
rumination (Levine & Edelstein, 2009).  These stimuli (IAPS photographs) are generally 
attention grabbing, and high in arousal (especially the negative images which may 
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include mutilated bodies, gore, and violence).  Images that elicit arousal may have 
different effects on attentional processing than those that reflect the typical daily concerns 
of individuals.  Therefore, the negative attentional biases that have been documented 
using highly arousing pictures may be a function of arousal rather than salience, as often 
times these individuals will not come into contact with the content of these images.  This 
would indicate that the experimental design was successful in the current study, but that 
attentional biases in terms of visually presented information may function as a result of 
arousal rather than personal concern.  Negative attentional biases have been shown with 
sad and angry faces as well (e.g., Gotlib et al., 2004a, Gotlib & Joorman, 2007). 
However, this could also be a function of visual processing that may not be reflective of 
negative cognitions associated with depression.  This again indicates problems with the 
conceptualization of negative attentional biases, and may indicate that self-relevance and 
mood congruency play only minor roles in comparison to depressive cognitions in 
attentional biases. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 
This study is one of the first to examine the role of self-relevance in attentional 
biases by means of participant generated pictures in a dot probe design.  Although this 
was a manipulation to ensure the stimuli incorporated in the task were highly salient and 
emotional to the participants, the experimental protocol required a good deal of effort, 
time, creativity and emotional insight from the participants.  This time- and effort- 
intensive design was not conducive to the sampling population of undergraduate students 
and their motivations for participation in research for course credit.  As a result, a number 
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of potential participants dropped out of the study before completing it.  It is possible that 
those participants who did complete the entire study represented a select, and non- 
representative, group.  The participants who completed the study tended to be highly 
motivated and willing to invest their time and effort.  This experiment was difficult for 
some participants, as there were problems with emotionality ratings of positive and 
negative pictures.  Therefore, it was difficult to assess the role these concepts may play in 
negativity biases in the current study.  However, past research offered support to the 
notion of incorporating content specific, emotional and salient stimuli into research 
designs (Wisco, 2009).   Thus, while the procedures used in the current study may have 
been difficult to implement, the basic idea of using idiographic and self-relevant stimuli 
warrants further exploration. 
Another limitation mentioned previously is the sampling of non-dysphoric 
individuals.  Although mood congruency plays a role in attentional biases, it may have 
been more informative to use naturally dysphoric individuals.  As a result, it is difficult to 
ascertain the generalizability and applicability of these findings with the majority of the 
attentional bias literature.  However, the present study utilized a mood manipulation that 
proved highly effective, particularly for the sad mood condition.  The incorporation of 
music and self-reflection may translate well across various research paradigms to 
examine the effects of mood congruency in the future. 
 
Future Directions 
 
Due to the importance of self-relevance in depressive cognition, it may be 
informative to modify the current experimental paradigm for including participant 
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provided pictures.  Since most research has documented biases with depression relevant 
or interpersonal stimuli such as sad faces, perhaps the design should include only these 
types of stimuli as well.  To further ensure the images are high in personal concern 
(relevant to the participant) and sadness, participants could complete Likert type rating 
scales in conjunction with taking the pictures.  As a result, these concepts could be 
monitored more effectively.  In addition, increased time could be devoted to the 
identification of all stimuli that will be included in the study as a manipulation to ensure 
appropriate pictures will be taken.  Ideally, stimulus content would be equated across 
participants (e.g. 5 pictures of people, 5 pictures of objects) to control for additional 
attentional processing of different objects included in the pictures and as a baseline for 
comparison across individuals.  In addition, although this study utilized digital cameras 
whose size and durability were preferable for a college sample, there were problems with 
picture quality.  Cameras with greater picture quality might provide participants with 
greater ease in capturing pictures, and may also decrease the likelihood that pictures 
would have to be re-taken. 
Other considerations for the current study include matching participants by gender, 
recruiting a larger sample, including a dysphoric group, and examining more complex 
hypotheses that model for time.  There was a relatively large number of females and low 
number of males included in this study, so it may be informative to match participants on 
gender and recruit a larger more representative sample.  In addition, inclusion of a larger 
dysphoric or depressed group may have different implications for the results as well.  
Dysphoric and depressed individuals may have greater ease providing 
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negative pictures, although may encounter difficulties providing positive pictures instead. 
The time intensive design may not be attractive to these participants, as depression can be 
associated by anhedonia and lack of interest.  However, it would be informative to 
explore attentional biases with a larger sample of dysphoric participants using generated 
pictures, and also compare the type of stimuli provided with that of a control group. 
Inclusion of a larger, more representative sample that included a dysphoric or depressed 
group would better generalize to other findings in the literature as well.  Lastly, it may be 
informative to examine the influence of time, and interactions of importance, valence, 
and mood state using a larger sample size and dysphoric individuals with depressive 
cognitive symptomatology.  The duration of the full dot probe task was long (8-9 
minutes), and it may be important to assess discrepancies in responses as a function of the 
passage of time as well. 
In terms of future studies on attentional biases, it seems informative to examine 
emotional attentional biases using dysphoric and depressed samples, exogenous cuing 
tasks and eye tracking equipment as well.  Exogenous cuing tasks present stimuli one 
picture at a time, attempting to control for possible confounding factors due to the 
simultaneous presentation of two stimuli in the dot probe design.  Utilization of these 
tasks in addition to eye tracking techniques would offer clarification as to all three 
systems of attentional processing: initial orientation, maintenance and the disengagement 
of attention and their role in attentional biases (Leyman et al., 2007). 
In addition, although there has been a shift towards examining attentional biases 
and negativity biases in implicit memory tasks, there has been a paucity of research 
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addressing the underlying mechanisms that may be driving these biases.  Theories such as 
elaborative processing and depth of processed have been suggested to play elemental 
roles in negativity biases; however, depth of processing accounts may offer inadequate 
explanations that equate length of time passed with the level of depth of processing.  The 
longer response latencies that have been shown across research paradigms utilizing self- 
relevant stimuli may be attributable to any number of factors such as intrusive thoughts, 
rumination, affective processing, inattention and/or fatigue.  Although further research is 
needed to add to the research confirming attentional biases in depression using cleaner 
paradigms (e.g. exogenous cuing tasks), additional research should be completed 
incorporating multiple paradigms (explicit, implicit, attentional tasks) to confirm 
theoretical foundations whereby these biases are thought to arise. Leyman, De Raedt, 
Schact & Koster have suggested that these biases operate in combination with negative 
depressive cognitive features.  Therefore, assessing consistencies across multiple tasks 
while taking encoding and retrieval effects into account would serve as an informative 
first step in the future. 
Summary 
 
In summary, this study examined attentional biases to emotional information using 
participant generated pictures in a dot probe design with mood induced (positive and 
negative) participants.  Primary results including non-dysphoric individuals indicated no 
significant differences between the two conditions in negative or positive attentional 
biases and no significant findings in reference to reaction time and the importance and 
valence ratings of the participant generated pictures.  However, there were significant 
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gender differences in response times, with females responding slower on average than 
males. Exploratory analyses indicated a near significant interaction of gender and 
priming condition on negative bias scores as well.  Females also tended to rate pictures as 
more important than males, which may play roles in future designs that attempt to use the 
aforementioned study design. 
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APPENDIX A. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 
Low BDI frequency of demographic variables and means and standard deviations for 
the STAI- State and STAI Trait and BDI self-report measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender   
Positive Priming 
Condition 
N  Mean  SD 
Negative Priming 
Condition 
N  Mean  SD 
 
Male 10   9  
Female 17   21 
 
Age (mean)  
 
19.41 
 
1.72  
 
19.6 
 
2.24 
 
Race 
African American 
 
 
 
9 
    
 
9 
  
American Indian or Alaskan Native 0   0   
Asian 3   1   
Hispanic or Latin American 2   1   
Caucasian 12   18   
Other 1   1   
 
STAI-State*  
 
9.81 
 
4.96  
 
16.43 
 
9.66 
STAI-Trait*  11.2 6.63  16.57 10.50 
BDI   2.33 1.75  2.67 1.81 
*indicates significant group differences at the .05 level 
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Table 2 
 
Low BDI group mean values for importance and valence ratings by 
condition. 
 
Condition N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
 
Negative Importance Positive 27 2 0.57672 0.11099 
Ratings Negative 30 2.21 0.50067 0.09141 
Negative Valence Positive 27 4.02 1.11926 0.2154 
Ratings* Negative 30 3.24 1.05642 0.19288 
Positive Importance Positive 27 2.93 0.6923 0.13323 
Ratings Negative 30 2.91 0.69587 0.12705 
Positive Valence Positive 27 9.09 1.17505 0.22614 
Ratings Negative 30 9.09 1.13332 0.20691 
* denotes significance at .05 level 
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Table 3 Low BDI group mean values for importance and valence ratings by gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative Importance 
Ratings* 
Negative Valence Ratings 
 
 
 
Positive Valence Ratings* 
 
 
 
 
Positive Importance Ratings* 
Gender Mean Std. Deviation N 
 
Male 1.9079 .48697 19 
 
Female 2.2155 .54655 38 
 
Male 3.9474 1.24726 19 
 
Female 3.4391 1.07150 38 
 
Male 8.6645 1.25437 19 
 
Female 9.3010 1.03577 38 
 
Male 2.6414 .77640 19 
 
Female 3.0592 .60281 38 
 
* denotes significance at .05 level 
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Table 4 
Low BDI means and standard deviations for Visual Analogue Scale mood ratings 
prior to and following mood manipulation. 
 
 
 
 Happy Happy Sad Sad 
Condition Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Positive 83.70 10.06 91.30 8.84 6.85 10.01 4.44 8.47 
   Negative  82.17  10.23  45.00  23.49  13.00  21.07  56.00  26.57   
73  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Low BDI means and standard deviations for negative and positive bias scores for each 
condition by gender. 
 
Positive Mood Condition 
 
Mean SD 
Negative Mood Condition 
 
Mean SD 
 
Negative Bias Scores 
 
Males 
Females 
Total 
Positive Bias Scores 
 
Males 
Females 
Total 
6.6563 8.88 
 
-4.1251 15.6 
 
-.1320 14.33 
 
 
 
 
4.4825 24.20 
 
-1.1080 19.15 
 
.9626 20.89 
-3.0076 14.2 
 
.6883 15.60 
 
-.4205 15.05 
 
 
 
 
-1.6796 23.96 
 
2.7214 22.28 
 
1.40 22.46 
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Fixed Effects Coefficient Std t-ratio df p value 
 
Neg Trial Slope, β1j 
Intercept, γ10 336.28 10.9 30 54 <.001 
Prime Condition γ11 -1.44 14.64 -.10 54 0.922 
Gender γ12 *47.96 13.38 3.58 54 <.001 
Pos Trial Slope, β2j 
Intercept, γ20 350.59 13.71 25.58 54 <.001 
Prime Condition, γ21 -2.45 14.58 -.17 54 0.867 
Gender, γ22 *40.20 14.12 2.85 54 0.006 
Probe Type Slope, β3j 
Intercept, γ30 1.67 3.43 .49 54 0.906 
Prime Condition, γ31 -.10 3.72 -.03 54 0.979 
Gender, γ32 -1.79 3.81 -.47 54 0.640 
Valence Rating Slope, β4j 
Intercept, γ40 -2.57 1.46 -1.76 7072 0.078 
Prime Condition, γ41 -0.20 1.15 -.17 7072 0.868 
Gender, γ42 1.74 1.24 1.41 7072 0.161 
Importance Rating Slope, β5j 
Intercept, γ50 .59 1.42 .42 7072 0.676 
Prime Condition, γ51 1.26 1.59 0.79 7072 0.428 
Gender, γ52 0.06 1.63 0.04 7072 0.969 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Low BDI HLM model estimations with robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
Error   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at .05 level 
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Table 7. Group mean reaction times standard deviations by condition and picture valence. 
 
Group 
 
Low BDI High BDI 
 
Negative Positive Negative Positive 
 
Valence Validity M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Negative Valid 
Trial 
374.18 62.57 368.01 53.93 411.32 76.11 400.76 104.47 
  Invalid 
Trial 
 
373.76 
 
63.28 
 
367.88 
 
50.57 
 
406.21 
 
84.76 
 
398.73 
 
92.84 
 
Positive 
 
Valid 
Trial 
 
374.96 
 
64.99 
 
369.75 
 
56.72 
 
416.96 
 
80.64 
 
389.06 
 
91.21 
  Invalid 
Trial 
 
376.36 
 
58.89 
 
370.71 
 
53.74 
 
423.20 
 
82.88 
 
392.56 
 
80.48 
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Figure 1. Interaction of gender and prime condition for l o w  B D I negative bias 
scores. 
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APPENDIX B. STUDY DOCUMENTS 
 
Computer Rating Task (eprime) 
 
For this task, you will be asked several questions about different pictures.  Please answer 
each question as accurately as possible.  If you have any questions, please ask the 
research assistant.  Please click on continue to begin. 
What emotion do you IMMEDIATELY feel in response to this image? 
 
-5=extremely negative 
 
-4=very negative 
 
-3=moderately negative 
 
-2=somewhat negative 
 
-1= slightly negative 
 
0=nothing at all 
 
1= slightly positive 
 
2=somewhat positive 
 
3=moderately positive 
 
4=very positive 
 
5=extremely positive 
 
How important is this image to you? 
 
1=not at all that important 
 
2=somewhat important 
 
3=moderately important 
 
4=extremely important 
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In one to two sentences, please describe why this image is emotional to you. 
 
 
*please note that these questions were asked for every picture 
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1 2 3 4 
Not at all easy Somewhat easy Moderately easy Very Eas 
 
 
 
 
  Camera User-Friendliness Survey 
 
Please use the following scale to answer the 4 questions below: 
 
 
 
y 
 
1. How easy was it to take pictures? 1 2 3 4 
2. How easy was it to adjust the zoom? 1 2 3 4 
3. How easy was it to delete pictures? 1 2 3 4 
4. How easy was it to review your pictures? 1 2 3 4 
 
5.  How was the battery life? Poor Average Good 
 
 
 
6.  What problems, if any, did you encounter with the camera? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  What suggestions, if any, do you have to enhance the ease of use with the 
camera and capturing emotional and unemotional photographs? 
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Mood Induction Procedure 
 
Negative Mood Induction  played with Beethoven’s string quartet op. 131 and 
positive mood priming played with Vivaldi’s ‘‘Spring’’ concerto of the ‘‘Four 
Seasons,’’ op. 12 for 5 minutes. 
 
Instructions:  Participants are told to “relax, make themselves comfortable, and 
focus their attention on the instructions they are about to hear. They are then told to 
imagine a situation that would leave them feeling either happy (if in positive mood 
priming condition) or sad (if in negative mood priming).  They are told that they 
could imagine situations that were real or hypothetical but that in either case they 
should generate vivid imagery of the events.” 
 
“I would like for you to begin imagining a situation that would make you feel [happy 
or sad]. Imagine the situation as vividly as you can. Picture the events happening to 
you. See all the details of the situation. Picture in your "mind's eye" the surroundings 
as clearly as possible. See the people or objects; hear the sounds; experience the 
event happening to you. Now write down everything you see, hear 
and are experiencing. 
 
Think the thoughts you would actually think in the situation. What are you 
thinking? Feel the same [happy or sad] feelings you would feel. What are you 
feeling? 
Let yourself react as if you were actually there.” 
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Photograph Tracking Sheet ID:    
*enter photo numbers in boxes and brief description 
 
Please note that if you return the camera with pictures that are 
unclear and/or inappropriate, you will be asked to take the pictures 
again!!!! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total= Total= Total= 
 
Are all my pictures clear?  If no, please take picture(s) again 
 
Do any of them look blurry?  Can I tell what my picture is by glancing at 
it? 
If yes to any, please take picture(s) again. 
 
 
Have I followed all the rules for taking pictures (not 
photographing people other than self, no violence, nudity, etc.)? 
If no, please take picture(s) again. 
 
As a reminder, you must include 64 DIFFERENT pictures, so make sure you do not 
include the same picture twice. 
*For flash, you move the cursor to the right (once to turn on, once again for different 
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flash setting, and then again to the right to turn it off). 
 
 
 
Please contact Tamara at tefoxwor@uncg.edu when you are finished. Remember, you 
have a week to take these pictures. 
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ID:    Date:    
 
Form:   _ 
 
 
 
 
Please  draw  a line below  indicating how you feel AT THIS MOMENT. 
 
 
 
 
Happy 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
not at all very much so 
 
 
 
Sad 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
not at all very much so 
 
 
 
Anxious 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
not at all very much so 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative Positive 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
